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Abstract
I use an extended version of Mincer’s original model to estimate the returns to schooling
in rural Ethiopia.  In a first step, a multinomial logit model is applied to distinguish
between four groups of people, (1) full-time farmers, (2) part-time farmers, part time wage
workers, (3) part-time farmers, part time traders and (4) full-time non-farmers.  In a
second step, a correction for sample selectivity is made using the Lee-Heckman method
and the returns are estimated.  The results show that returns on schooling are high in
group (4) and lower in groups (2) and (3).  Entry in well-paid jobs is constrained for non
educated people.  Women are particularly well represented in the third group but strongly
underrepresented in the fourth group.  The estimation shows that education is a worthwile
investment in rural Ethiopia and the fact that households underinvest in education can be
attributed to the lack of resources at the household level.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Ethiopia has one of the lowest enrolment rates in the world.  Only 20% of all school aged
children in rural Ethiopia are going to school.  The causes for this low degree of
participation in schooling are to be found at the level of the household, the provider as well
as the labour market
1
.  In this paper, I want to take a close look at one aspect of the
problem.  I address the question whether or not education is a worthwhile investment in
rural Ethiopia.  Can we make general statements about the return to education or is the
return conditional on entry in certain jobs?  This research follows up on previous research
where I examined the determinants of household schooling decisions.  Lack of resources at
the household level is one of the major reasons why children are not attending school in
rural Ethiopia
2
.
The outline of the paper is as follows : after a review of the literature on education, returns
and off-farm activities, I present the Mincerian model, the occupational choice model and
the Lee-Heckman correction method for sample selectivity.  Part four of the paper gives
descriptive statistics and part five discusses the econometric specification.  I present
estimation results in part six and a conclusion at the end of the paper.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Many studies report parental education as an important determinant of child schooling.
Strauss and Thomas (1995) for example refer to a number of studies where a positive
relation is found between parental and child schooling.  An explanation for this positive
relation is found in two papers by Appleton and Mackinnon(1993).  These authors call this
effect the intergenerational transmission of education and they give several reasons for it:
(1) educated parents have the skills to help children in homework, (2) educated parents are
mostly richer and can devote more resources to education than other parents, (3) educated
parents stimulate and motivate their children strongly, (4) educated parents derive more
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2direct utility from their child’s education and will therefore devote more resources to
education, (5) educated parents expect a higher return from investment in education and
will therefore invest more, (6) educated parents have access to more accurate information.
Psacharopoulos (1985) reports high returns on primary and secondary education in African
countries.  He summarised estimates of returns to education for 60 different countries in the
1970s.  Developing countries had a return of 15 percent on average per year of education,
whereas the average for high-income countries was 9 percent per year.  The first
explanation for these high returns is just the law of supply and demand.  Wages for schooled
workers (and therefore returns) are high because they reflect the relative scarcity of human
capital.
The methodological problem here is that if education is correlated with family background,
then returns to education are overestimated, because part of the return has to be devoted to
family background characteristics.   Lam and Schoe i (1993) for example report that returns
to schooling fall by one-third when parental schooling is added to wage equations.  The
authors interpret this as evidence that parental characteristics represent unobservable
worker attributes.  Direct effects o   parental schooling on wages are substantial according
to Lam and Schoeni, but well below the returns to a worker's own schooling.  Schooling as
well as unobservable characteristics can also be important determinants of entry in the paid
labour force.
Most of the recent work on returns to education in developing countries correct for
selectivity in the labour force.  Alderman, Behrman, Ross and Sabot (1996) for example
perform a joint maximum likelihood estimation of the wage relation and of current wage-
labour participation as a comparison between wages and the returns to alternative activities
in rural Pakistan.  The returns to alternative time use, in turn, are affected in part by a set of
variables that do not enter directly into the wage relation, so they permit identification of
the selectivity control in the wage equation.  As Krishnan (1996) points out, the problem is
to find identifying instruments for this selection equation, since many of the variables which
determine earnings are also likely to determine entry in the paid labour force.  To do the
selectivity-correction correctly, an equation explaining the probability that a person is in a
particular group is specified, using land, livestock and other variables in the selection
equation and making sure that at least one of these variables differs from the variables used
in the wage equation.
Heckman and Hotz (1986) estimate earnings equations for Panamanian males and find also
that estimated returns to the worker's own schooling drop by about one-third when father's
3and mother's education is included in the regression.  Controlling for a large set of family
background variables, Lam and Schoeni (1983) estimate a return on schooling of over 10
percent per year for Brazilian data.  They pay attention to the problem of measurement
error and suggest that the decline in returns to schooling by introducing family background
characteristics may be explained by measurement error in schooling.  The decline in rate of
return to schooling can therefore be overestimated, too.
In this paper, the researcher focuses on the economic return of human capital investments,
being entry in the labour market and earnings.  Schooling also has social returns, which are
however difficult to quantify.  A good example of a social return is found in Dercon (1996).
He reports a strong health effect of female education on children: mothers who had primary
education will seek medical treatment for their child in case of illness much more then
uneducated mothers, namely 25% more.  De con and Krishnan (1996) found
intergenerational social effects of education: the father’s education had a strong effect on
his son’s behaviour towards the use of contraception.  This however, demands a long
planning horizon, probably to long for poor people.
If education is important for entry in the labour market, then parents have an incentive to
invest in child schooling. One therefore expects that parents have a reason to send their
child to school even when direct economic returns from this investment are low. The
economic return from schooling is the difference in wages between educated and non-
educated workers.  There are two main explanations for these wage differentials in the
literature.  The first one is the pure human capital thesis that wages reflect marginal
productivity and that education increases a worker's productivity.  The second is the
screening hypotheses which argues that education serves as a screen for unobserved innate
characteristics.  In this case we should observe a 'diploma effect ': completing primary and
secondary education should increase income significantly.  I will test these hypotheses by
using dummies for educational levels in one regression and number of years in school in
another regression.
The focus on off-farm activities is this paper is partly justified by data limitations (see
further on) but also because several authors point out the importance of off-farm work for
the diversification of income in rural households. R ardon (1997) gives an interesting
summary of recent findings. The simple average share of income earned in off-farm
activities over 25 studies of African households is 45%. He also finds evidence showing the
poor distribution of off-farm earnings in rural areas. Richer households earn substantial
income in off-farm self-employment and hire in (poorer) farm labourers to work on their
4farms. Reardon interprets these findings as (at least rough) evidence for entry barriers and
labour market segmentation in rural Africa.
3. OUTLINE OF THE MAIN MODEL
3.1. Mincer’s model
One of the main contributions of human capital theory is the relation made between
earnings, costs and rates of return.  According to Becker (1993) the most important single
determinant of the amount invested in human capital may well be its profitability or rate of
return
3
.  Both he and Mincer (1974) develop a model that relates earnings, opportunity
costs and investment in education.  Becker derives his model by taking differences in
earnings of an individual that invested in education and an individual that not invested in
education.  Mincer uses earnings ratio’s between these two individuals.  I will follow
Mincer’s approach since his model leads directly to a specification that can be estimated and
where the coefficient of schooling can be interpreted as the rate of return on investment in
schooling.
Mincer’s basic model goes as follows:
let Ys be the annual earnings of an individual with s years of schooling
let Vs be the present value of an individual’s lifetime earning
let n be the fixed span of earning life (the cost of schooling must be recouped during a fixed
period)
let d be the discount rate
let d be the difference in the years of schooling
let K be  the earnings ratio
( )V Ys s tt= +å 11 d when the process is discrete (1.1)
( )( )ò
+ --- -==
sn
s
ns
s
t
ss eeYdteYV
ddd d 1 when the process is continuous (1.2)
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4
( ) dsds
dssdss eeeYYK
ddd === ----- /, (1.4)
We see that K, the earnings ratio, does not depend on the levels of schooling nor on t e
length of earning life
Now we define, K Y Y Kso s s, = =0 (1.5)
According to equation (1.4) K es
s= d (1.6)
In logarithms, this means
sYYs d+= 0lnln (1.7)
Equation (1.7) shows a relationship between earnings and years in school whereby d is the
rate of return of investment in schooling.  d shows the percentage increase in wage when
schooling is prolonged by 1 year.  It is a percentage increase because
ln Y = dY/Y = (Y2 - Y1)/ Y1.  The percentage increase in earnings are strictly proportional
to the absolute difference of the time spent in school.
Equation (1.7) is the basic Min erian earnings equation.  One can estimate it in a semi-log
formulation with the log of earnings as the dependent variable and years of schooling as the
independent variable.
Mincer formulated his model originally under the assumption of perfect credit markets,
meaning that individuals face the same interest rate.  Furthermore he assumes that interest
rates and discount rates are the same.  His model can thus be written in the following way:
rsYY os += lnln (1.8)
5
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This model, in its discrete form, can also be derived directly from
Y s = (1 + r)
s  Yo
ln Ys = ln Yo + sln (1+r) »
6There are four major problems with this approach.  The first is the assumption of perfect
credit markets which are hardly found in developing countries.  The second that it is far
from obvious that rural people adopt their preferences (discount rate) to market conditions
(interest rate)
6
.  This is only the case in a highly integrated labour market. Third, all other
factors affecting earnings are summarised in ln Yo. And fourth, all years of schooling have
the same return to the individual, as if the first year of primary schooling gives the same
return as the third year. The first two remarks will be discussed in the empirical part of this
paper. The model is extended to deal with the third remark and the fourth problem is
discussed at the end of this section.
A first extension of the model in (1.8) is done by including years of labour market
experience and its square as independent variables.  People namely do not stop the learning
proces once they finish schooling, they also develop skills while working. According to
human capital theory, this enhances the productivity of the workers. We also include the
square of the years of experience to capture the non-linear effect of experience.
This gives the following model
( )221 expexplnln bbrsYY os +++= (1.9)
Following Lam and Schoeni (1993), we also extend the model with family background
variables. If one estimates (1.8) but the real equation is
( ) FBcbbrsYY os .expexplnln 1221 ++++= (1.10)
where FB is the unobserved family background of a child.  Assume now that family
background and schooling are positively correlated, then we have a missing variable
problem in (1.8).  Returns on education are overestimated because earnings are also
determined by FB.  In the extreme case, both schooling and earnings are entirely determined
by FB which makes the content of formal education useless for economic life.
Mincer makes the assumption that all years of education have the same return. Several
authors however report high marginal returns to primary education and low marginal
returns to secondary education.  Psacharopoulos (1994), using the Minc rian method,
reports a marginal return to completed primary education of over 40%. In order to pick up
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7a different effect from primary and secondary education, dummy variables for education are
introduced.  When a person has completed primary education, the dummy is one.  The same
counts for other levels of education.  In this way, one can measure the additional effect of
having completed junior and secondary education. In the approach chosen here, the
secondary education variable for example catches the marginal effect of having completed
secondary education.  Most pupils indeed stop education in the age between 12 and 15.
One can ask the question if it is worth continuing for the secondary school degree?  Does
this level of schooling adds a return?  When not, it is economically rational to quid school
after junior or primary school.
This model can be written as follows:
( )221321 expexpsec...lnln bbajunapraYY os +++++= (1.11)
One can argue that a separate variable for the number of years in primary school and a
number of years in secondary school should be introduced. In this way, the difference in the
marginal effect of each year of primary and each year of secondary education on the wages
can be determined.
3.2. A model of occupational choice
The schooling variable in Mi cer’s model only captures the direct effect of schooling on
wage. From previous studies we know that schooling also has an indirect effect, it is one of
the determinants of entry into an occupation. In order to account for this, we have to
construct a choice model where a set of independent variables determine the kind of
occupation that an individual is engaged in.
According to Dercon and Krishnan (1995), the characteristics of individuals explain the kind
of economic activity these individuals choose.  In a paper on income portfolios in Tanzania
and Ethiopia, Dercon and Krishnan explain this as follows:
“certain activities will offer higher returns to households with particular skills,
ability or composition than to households without such advantages.  However, some
activities will require substantial investment, so that poorer or credit constrained
households will not be able to enter them.  In fact, skill or ability constraints may be
sufficient to exclude certain households from particular activities.  Comparative
advantage and entry constraints will not just help to explain differences in portfolios
within particular areas or villages, but also across areas or countries.  Access to
public infrastructure such as market places and roads, proximity to towns, common
8property resources such as forest, and other public goods will also contribute to the
different portfolio patterns across regions.”
From the work of  Bevan and Pankhurst (1996) we know that there is a clear division of
labour between the sexes in rural Ethiopia.  Woman are responsible for domestic work
(cooking, cleaning, looking after the small children, repairing clothes, looking after elderly
and ill people) and for light agricultural work and income generating activities.  While the
shadow price of labour for males and boys is determined by the cultivated area of land per
capita, the shadow price of female labour is determined by the size of the household.  In
large households therefore, few time is left for a woman to be engaged in paid activities,
since her labour is valued high in the household.
And, in many villages traditional income generating activities (weaving, tanning, pottery, ...)
have been looked down on.  Nevertheless and in spite of her domestic work, woman are
active in trading at market places and in selling agricultural products in Africa.  Women
allocate their time in such a way that they combine their work at home with their work for
pay.
These kinds of problems require the use of a multinomial model. A multinomial logit model
determines the probability of ending up in one of occupations or categories of occupations.
The model is a natural extension of the binary logit model.  The categories in the dependent
variable are discrete, nominal or unordered.
Let us first look at the binary choice model
7
The probability of having y = 1 instead of zero can be written as follows
{ } ( )Pr ,ob y G xk= =1 b (2.1)
where G is a functional form containing the vectors x and b.
Usually, the functional form is restricted to
( ) ( )G x F xk k,b b= ¢  (2.2)
where F is a cumulative distribution function
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9It is possible to derive a binary choice model using a latent variable presentation of the
model
y kk
* = +å b e (2.3)
where y* is an unobserved latent variable and e symmetrically distributed with zero mean
and cumulative distribution function F(e).  What we observe is a dummy variable y, a
realisation of a binomial process, defined by
y if y and y otherwise= > =*1 0 0
therefore
( ) ( )
( )
( )
Pr Pr
Pr
ob y ob
ob x
F x
kk
k kk
k kk
= = + >å
= > -å
= - - å
1 0
1
b e
e b
b
(2.4)
The specific functional form of F depends on the assumptions that one makes concerning
the distribution of e.  In case of the binary logit model, we assume that e follows a logistic
distribution.  This distribution is almost similar to the standard normal distribution but
instead of a variance of 1 it has a variance of p2/3.
In that case
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Prob y L x e ek kk x xk kk k kk= = å = å + å1 1b b b (2.5)
The model in (2.5) is the binary logit model, it represents the probability of the event
occurring (y = 1)
8
.
The multinomial logit model is a straight forward extension of the model in (2.5).  The
multinomial model estimates the effects of explanatory variables on a dependent variable
with unordered response categories.  The equation
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( ) ( ) ( )Prob y j e ek kk k kkx xj= = å + ååb b1 (2.6)
is referred to as the multinomial l git model.  In this model, the choice probabilities are
dependent on individual characteristics only.  The model estimates relative probabilities,
defined relative to the base group (the full-time farmers in my analysis).  The numbers of
parameters to be estimated is equal to the number of individual characteristics multiplied by
the number of possible choices minus one.  Each of our adults will fall into one of the 4
categories with probabilities given by (2.6).  The subscript j indicates that there are J-1 sets
of b estimates.
3.3. Lee-Heckman correction for selectivity
At the time of a survey, many people are not engaged in paid labour.  With ‘ paid work ’ I
mean an activity for which the labouring person receives an amount of money or an amount
in kind.  The majority of the rural working population does not participate in paid work.
They are full-time farmers or domestic workers.  Because it is very difficult to value
domestic work and farmers' output, rates of return on education are typically only measured
for persons doing paid work.  In this case, we have a sample-selection problem, some
people are 'selected' into the paid labour force and other people not.
In a wage-equation, sample-selectivity can in fact be seen as an omitted variable problem.
The researcher believes that his estimated returns are biased because something is missing in
the equation.  It is the same story as we had before: in section 3.1, we wondered if parental
education had an influence on earnings.  If this is the case, returns on education are
overestimated when parental education is left out of the equation.
The sample-selectivity problem is a problem of omitted variables: something affects the
earnings of a person, and this is not captured by the variables already in the equation.  This
problem can be solved by first explaining the reason why some people are 'selected' into the
paid labour force.  This information is then used to eliminate the potential bias in the
estimation of the private returns to schooling.  When participation is positively related to
human capital variables, the coefficients on the human capital variables in the OLS wage
equations - not corrected for selectivity - are likely to be biased.
11
The conventional sample selection model has the following form (3.1)
y xi i i
* = +b e with i from 1 to n, with n the number of cases in the sample
d z vi i i
* = +g with i from 1 to n
d if d di i i= > =1 0 0
* ; otherwise
y y di i i= ×
* ;
where yi
*  is a latent endogenous variable and yi the observed variable; di
*  is a latent variable
with associated indicator function di reflecting the selection equation.  ei  a d vi are zero
mean terms with ( )E vi ie ¹ 0.  We make the assumption (ass.1) that ei and vi are
independently and identically distributed N(0,S).
Where =å
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
s s
s s
e ev
ev v
2
2
OLS estimation of b over the subsample n corresponding to di = 1 will lead to inconsistent
estimates due to the correlation between xi and i.
Different procedures are used in empirical work, but two-step estimation is the most
common approach.  I will use the parametric two-step estimation like Heckma did (1976,
1979)
9
Our primary equation of interest is
y xi i i= +b e with i from 1 to n (3.2)
Knowing that ( )E x di i ie , ,= ¹1 0  the method proposed by Heckman (1976) is to
overcome this misspecification through the inclusion of a correction te m which accounts
for ( )E z di i ie , .= 1
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To employ this approach, we take the conditional expectation of (3.2) in order to get
( ) ( )E y z d x E z di i i i i i i, ,= = + =1 1b e ; i from 1 to n from bivariate normality it follows
that ( ) ( ) ( )E z d E v vi i i i i ev v ie e s s, = = =1 2 .  This can be proved.
Using assumption 1 and the formula for the conditional expectation of a truncated random
variable we note that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]E z d z zi i i ev v i ie s s f g g= = - - -1 12 F (3.3)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Lee (1983) has shown that this also works in case of a logistic distribution.  This is what I
need, because I am using a (multinomial) logit model.
In (3.3) we replace f by l and F by L, L being the cumulative distribution function of the
logistic distribution.  The second term on the right hand side of the equation in (3.3) is
known as the inverse Mills ratio.Thus, the two-step procedure suggested by Heckmann first
estimates g over the entire N observations and then constructs an estimate of the inverse
Mills ratio.  One can then consistently estimate the parameters by OLS over the n
observations reporting values for yi by including
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
E z d
v v dv
i i i ev v i
ev v i i
e s s l
s s
, = =
= ò
1
1
2
2
 as an additional regressor in (3.2)
We estimate
y xi i i i= + +b m l h (3.4)
by OLS.  The t-test on the null hypothesis m=0 is a test of sev = 0 and represents a test of
sample selectivity bias.In equation (3.4), one clearly views the problem as a problem of
omitted variables.  Least squares regressions of y on x and l would produce consistent
estimates, but if l s omitted, the specification error of an omitted variable is committed.  If
l is observed, OLS estimates are consistent but inefficient.  The disturbance h is
heteroscedastic
10
.
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4. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
In the beginning of the nineties, Ethiopia entered a process of profound transformation.
The Centre for African Economies at Oxford University and Addis Ababa University
decided to do a large scale rural household survey as a follow up of a survey done by the
International Food Policy Research Institute in 1989. The sample consists of 1477
households in 15 areas of Ethiopia.  No attempt has been made to have a representative
sample of rural Ethiopia.  According to Derc n and Krishnan (1995), the geographical
spread however is likely to provide a very relevant picture of rural Ethiopia.  Random
sampling is applied in each site and the number of households interviewed in each site was
proportional to the population of the region relative to the national population.
This paper uses data of this survey, concentrating on the parts in the survey where questions
on education and off-farm activities were asked.  In the survey, enumerators asked how
many days the respondent had worked for pay in the last four months.  We do not have
information on hours worked per day or on hourly earnings.  This could cause biases in
estimation because not all people work for pay the same number of hours per day.  This
may not be important in a regulated , industrialised country, but it is important in a rural
Ethiopia, where much of the employment is informal and highly variable in hours worked.
Individuals who work many hours a day will -ceteris paribus - have higher daily earnings.
A comparison of the earnings per day between men and women shows that men earn much
more than women.  It is however risky to attribute this to discrimination in the labour
market, since we only have information on days worked.  We know, that women do a lot of
household work on a daily basis and it is therefore very likely that they work less hours a
day for pay then man do.  This is not observable from the data on earnings since we only
asked for daily earnings.  Of course, it is possible that there is a high degree of variance in
the hours worked between men too. To avoid possible distortion we will conduct separate
wage equations for men and women after correcting for selectivity.
We also asked what pay the respondent received for this labour.  This pay could be
expressed in kind or in cash.  The pay in kind was converted to kilograms and valued at the
local price (also expressed per kg of course) for that commodity.  In case of payment both
in cash or in kind, both were added up.  In case of more than one off-farm activity, the
earnings of all activities were summed.  Then, all earnings were divided by the numbers of
14
days worked, which gave earnings per day.  Since prices and crops differ substantially
according to villages, this calculation was performed separately for all villages
11
.
For the dependent variable, the log of earnings per month is used.  One cannot take total
earnings in these four months as dependent variable, because in that case earn gs re also
determined by the number of days worked.  It may be that earnings per day and number of
days worked for pay are determined by the same variables .  Table 1 shows an example of
this problem: more educated people seem to supply more labour.  If  they ea n more in
these four months, this can be due to their education, but also because they have worked
more.
Table 1: days worked for pay (averages) during last four months by level of education
level of education
no educationmax.     primary
school
max.      high
school
max.
university
DAYS WORKED 40.23 37.86 48.48 96.50
In order to control for days worked, it is necessary to take earnings per day as a basic
variable.  I assume daily earnings to be independent of number of days worked
12
. There are
1224 individuals in the sample who report to do off-farm work.  912 also gave us the pay
they got for their work.  I will use these 912 persons to do the regressions.
I first discuss descriptive statistics of participation in paid work in rural Ethiopia.  One can
distinguish four groups in rural Ethiopia when it comes down to paid work.  We have 3097
individuals (>14 years) who or either farmers or domestic workers and who are not engaged
in any kind of off-farm activity.  These people are full-time working at home or on their
farm.  They do not participate in paid work.  A second group consists of 802 individuals
whose main activity is also farming or doing domestic work, but next to that, they
participate in off-farm activities.  These people are part-timers, they devote some of their
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working time at home or on their own farm and other time working for pay.  These paid
activities can be very diverse: working on someone else’s farm, food-for-work, domestic
servant, unskilled labour, collecting and selling firewood, trading grain or other crops, trade
in livestock.
Because of the diversity of the economic activities and the theoretical explanation of Dercon
and Krisnan (page 7), the group of 802 people is split in two groups: a group of 294 people
working on the farm (or at home) and doing part-time wage labour and another group of
508 people doing part-time farm work and part-time incoming earning activities.  Table 2
shows that people in wage-labour have lesser land endowments and livestock than peopl  in
income earning activities.  They also live further away from town.  From Bevan and
Pankhurst (1996) we also know that in the rural areas wage-labour is looked down on.
Table 2: Second and third group compared
farmer
and
wage-labourer
farmer
and income earning
activities
size of the household 6.31 6.20
age in years 37 36
land endowment 1.00 3.06
value of livestock 906.7 2818.8
no. of years at school (excluding nursery)4.02 3.55
distance to town in km 11.97 8.65
Table 3: Part-time farmers/part-time wage workers are involved in:
Frequency Percent
Farm worker 65 22.1
Labour sharing 11 3.7
Labourer (skilled) 16 5.4
Unskilled worker 39 13.3
Domestic servant 8 2.7
Food-for-work 137 46.6
Other 17 6.1
Total 294 100.0
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Table 4: Part-time farmers/part time income earning activities are involved in:
Frequency Percent
Weaving/Spinning 71 14.0
Handicraft 49 9.6
Trade in grain, Sales 92 18.1
Trade in livestock 27 5.3
Transport 7 1.4
Collecting and selling wood, water or fuel237 46.7
Other 15 2.4
Total 508 100.0
The main activity of the fourth group of people is not farming, nor working at home.  They
are full-time engaged in paid work.  They are teachers, factory workers, mechanics,
administrators, traders, ...
Table 5: Full time off-farm workers are involved in:
Frequency Percent
Manual worker 39 9.2
Weaver 12 2.8
Craftworker/potter 39 9.2
Foodseller (Tella) 37 8.8
Driver/Mechanic 10 2.4
Skilled (factory) worker 17 4.0
Teacher 18 4.3
Party official/Administrator 17 4.0
Soldier 30 7.1
Trader 125 29.6
Other 78 18.1
Total 422              100.0
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Table 6: Earnings in Birr, males and females
Occupation per month
M F
Farmer AND Min 7.61 10.69
wage-earners Max 1139 416
Mean 108.6 82.53
Farmer AND Min 1.83 1.67
income earning Max 2083 1000
activities Mean 177.8 98.53
Non-farmer Min 15.63 8.33
Max 2075 958.3
Mean 234.4 77.04
Table 6 shows the earnings-profile of people doing off-farming activities in rural areas in
Ethiopia.  From these three groups, part-time wage-earners have the lowest incomes and
non-farmers the highest.  Men earn more then women, especially when they are full-time
non-farmers.
5. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
5.1. Estimating Mincer’s model
I will first estimate the model as specified by the 
for the entire sample, not corrected for sample selectivity in one of the off-farm groups.
This estimation allows us to get a first look at the effects and to compare with later more
 I repeat the regression, but this time, I use dummy variables for
5.2. Specification of the occupational choice model
The decision to participate in wage labour or to exercise another non-farming economic
household, to start with, has an important influence on the labour decisions of all household
18
members.  If your household head owns a farm in rural Ethiopia, it is likely that you work
on the farm. In order to avoid an endogeneity problem, I left out all heads of households
from the estimation. Labour has a different shadow price for every household depending on
the land endowments and the number of household members.  When cultivated land is large
compared to household members, the likelihood of working off-farm is expected to
decrease because the labour is needed on the own farm, the members of the household have
a higher reservation wage.  When cultivated land is small compared to household members,
the shadow price of labour is lower and the probability to do off-farm work is likely to
increase.  In this case, farming may not yield enough output for the household to survive in
which case off-farm work gives a supplementary income
13
.
The independent variables in the multinomial ogit model determine the relative probability
of ending up in one of the three mentioned groups : part-time farmers and wage-labourers,
part-time farmers and income generating activities and non-farmers. The group of full-time
farmers or domestic workers is  the baseline group.
I use the size of the household, the occupation of the household head, the level of education
of the household member, the value of the livestock of the household, the area of cultivated
land per capita, the presence of an all-weather road and the distance to the nearest town as
independent variables in the multinomial logit estimation. The parameters in this model are
estimated using maximum likelihood.
I  expect a positive relation between schooling and the chance to do off-farm work.  It is
often said that educated persons don't want to be a farmer anymore.  But one can wonder if
educated persons have parents that are farmers.  What I mean is that I also expect a positive
relation between the head of the household being a non-farmer and the probability of
household members of being in the fourth group, namely the non-farmers.  Children from
non-farming households have a comparative disadvantage in farming.
The value of the livestock is introduced as a proxy for wealth in rural Ethiopia. Wealthier
households are expected to be well-r presented in income generating activities (group 3).
Most of these activities namely demand collateral or assets. The proximity of roads and
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In a paper on child labour (Addisson, Bhalotra, Coulter and Heady, 1997) the authors found some
empirical evidence that supports this theory.  Landless households make less use of the labour of their
children than households with land.  Households with land use the labour of their children to work on
the farm.  This gives rise to the apparent paradox that child labour is greater in relatively better-off
rural households.  (Cain 1977, Stekes et al 1984, Fure 1983 and Vlassoff 1979).
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towns is expected to increase the probability of choosing wage labour because they reduce
transportation costs and increase the demand for wage labour.
I will estimate the returns on investment in education for the three groups doing off-farm
work separately.  Moreover, as we noticed before, women work fewer hours for pay than
men do and since we only have data on daily earnings, I estimate wage regressions for
women and men separately to avoid potential bias.
5.3. Lee-Heckman specification
If one wants to estimate returns to education, one has to take account of the selection bias
in paid labour.  The idea is that if people in the labour force, be it part-time or full-time
workers, are non-random samples of the population, the observed earnings distribution
gives a non-random picture of the real distribution, thereby causing biased OLS estimates of
the Mincerian log-earnings function.  The purpose therefore is to estimate returns on
education corrected for the selectivity bias in paid labour.
We estimate equation (3.4)
y xi i i i= + +b m l h
by OLS.  The t-test on the null hypothesis m sev  0 and represents a test of
sample selectivity bias.
6.1. First estimation
Regression 1 shows the results of four specifications.  One has to be careful with the
labour force, returns to education will be biased.
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Regression 1:Comparisons of rates of return to education across different specifications of
the wage function.
These regressions are not corrected for selectivity into the paid labour force.
Monthly earnings used as dependent variable.
variables used Basic
Mincerian
method
basic Mincerian
method
Lam and
Schoeni
Lam and
Schoeni
Intercept 4.07 (10.5) 4.242(11.12) 4.07(10.52) 4.24 (11.1)
Number of
years in school
0.047(3.86) 0.047(4.04)
Primary ed. 0.27 (1.7) 0.26 (1.6)
Junior ed. 0.33 (1.53) 0.34 (1.57)
Secondary ed. 0.082(0.25) 0.08 (0.25)
age in years 0.015(0.73) 0.009(0.47) 0.015(0.073) 0.009(0.47)
age square -0.0009(-0.36) -0.0002(0.91) -0.0003(-1.6) -0.0002(-0.99)
sex dummy -0.23(-2.07) -0.212(-1.882) -0.215(-1.9) -0.21(-1.86)
Father’s ed. -0.0002 -0.0002
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.048
F-stat (0.00) 4.5 4.9 (0.00) (0.00)
Every year of schooling seems to give an additional income of 4.7%.  The coefficient of the
1% level. When returns are this high, households have
observe a very low enrolment rate, which means that either the Mincerian specification
case, households cannot send children to school, even if they wanted to.
The two age variables, measuring labour market experience have the expected sign but are
female.  In the specification with dummies, only the dummy for primary education is
significant. Completion of primary school gives a return of 27%.
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In the third specification, father’s education is added based on the arguments of Lam and
Schoeni.  Fathers' education does not prove to be significant and the coefficients of our
schooling variable does not lower because of the introduction of this new variable. This
could be an important result, since several papers (e.g. Lam and Schoeni (1993)) report
strong effects of parental education on earnings of children.  However, making use of
father’s education in the regression is difficult because there is very few variation across the
sample. 87 percent of the father’s have no education and 8 percent of the data are missing
which leaves only 5 percent of the data set to provide  variation. The researcher therefore
hesitates to use this variable in the following regressions.
Up to here, the variable measuring the numbers of years in school has shown to be
significant in our wage-regressions.  From the dummy-variables used, only the primary
school dummy was significant (at the 10% level).  The two other education dummies are
not significant.  These results however, are not conclusive enough to favour the human
capital interpretation of schooling (knowledge learned in school enhances one’s productivity
which is rewarded with higher wages) against the screening hypotheses.  In the latter case
we would expect a diploma-effect: employers use diploma’s as screens for unobservable
abilities.  Schooling as such would not have a productivity-increasing effect.  Our results
indicate that the return on completed primary education is not very different from the return
per year over six years.  Moreover, since the dummy for primary education also is
significant, we cannot opt for one of the two theories.  The test is performing well for the
primary education variables, but we have to keep in mind that the test is not corrected for
sample selectivity and that it remains are rather weak test.  In order to falsify one of the
theories, the researcher has to have firm level data indicating the way employers hire and
reward people.
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6.2.1. Results of  the multinomial 
Regression 2a
For Men For Women
Dependent variable(KEUS) occupational choice occupational choice
Number of observations 2044 2277
Iterations completed 9 14
Log likelihood function -1784.036 -1442.62
Restricted log likelihood -2108.131 -1707.935
Chi-squared 648.1893 530.6183
Degrees of freedom 27 27
Significance level 0.00 0.00
variable coefficient sig. coefficient sig.
part time wage workers
Constant -2.0404 0.00002 5.4749 0.0000
HHSIZE -0.05936 0.02509 -0.10302 0.0523
DUMFARM -0.17487 0.65322 -0.70510 0.0806
PRIMC 0.27669 0.37592 -10 .862 0.97180
JUNC -0.54332 0.30322 0.69208 0.99879
HIGHC 0.77009 0.38715 -0.61653 0.99916
LIVVAL -0.00036 0.00000 -0.00034 0.03972
CULTCP -1.0334 0.00922 -5.5358 0.00272
ALLWROAD 0.87843 0.00000 2.3223 0.0000
TOWNKM 0.12462 0.00000 0.27854 0.0000
part time income generating activities
Constant -1.4661 0.00317 -2.5276 0.0000
HHSIZE -0.072788 0.00418 -0.10233 0.0006
DUMFARM 0.29505 0.49251 0.23248 0.45108
PRIMC 0.44193 0.10780 0.37078 0.43139
JUNC 0.26108 0.49254 -0.86576 0.27385
HIGHC -0.54272 0.50495 -11.878 0.98052
LIVVAL 0.000023 0.16861    0.00026 0.11458
CULTCP 0.89935 0.00000 1.3531 0.0000
ALLWROAD -0.44999 0.00369 0.65993 0.00002
TOWNKM -0.0273 0.12253 0.02255 0.17445
full-time non-farmers
Constant -0.088381 0.81506 -0.32616 0.34222
HHSIZE 0.050009 0.04374 0.021528 0.38288
DUMFARM -3.0776 0.00000 -1.8057 0.0000
PRIMC 0.52960 0.08805 -0.35951 0.52779
JUNC 0.35829 0.37905 0.48993 0.52274
HIGHC 2.3643 0.00000 0.48993 0.52274
LIVVAL -0.00010 0.04129 -0.000083 0.00655
CULTCP -2.2093 0.00003 -1.6464 0.00643
ALLWROAD 0.93119 0.00001 0.53263 0.01271
TOWNKM -0.052210 0.00681 -0.06818 0.00065
variables used:
HHSIZE is the size of the household, DUMFARM head of the household is farmer or not, PRIMC
completed primary education or not (same for JUNC and HIGHC), LIVVAL value of livestock,
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CULTCP cultivated land per capita, ALLWROAD presence of an all-weather road or not,
TOWNKM distance to nearest town.
The results in Regression 2a show the effect the independent variables have on the relative
probability of being in one of the three groups.  The results presented are not the marginal
effects of each variable on this probability.  I will only look at the sign and the size of the
effect of each variable.  Both men and women from larger households have a smaller chance
of doing off-farm work then men and women from smaller households.  This effect
however, only holds in the case of part-time work. If your head of the household is a
farmer, it is very unlikely that you will be a full-time non-farmer.  The dummy, which can be
interpreted as a family background variable, namely shows a negative and very significant
effect, both for males and females.  The relative probability for females to be engaged in off-
farm wage work for part of their time also decreases when the head is a farmer
14
.  The
author did not include father’s education as a family background variable in the estimation
because of the lack of variation of this variable in each of the subgroups and especially in
one of the subgroups (see also page 20). Given the importance of agriculture, the
occupation of the head of the household is probably a better family backg ound variable.
The dummy variables for the educational level of the individuals are significant for entry in a
full-time non-farming occupation.  This is a strong result.  One does not have to be
educated in rural Ethiopia to do off-farm work for a part of one’s time, but one does need a
to complete school if one wants to enter a non-farming economic activity as main
occupation.  This is clearly indicated by the significance of the dummies for education.
However, the results on the education variables only hold for men. For females, the
dummies for education are not significant. These effects indicate that men without schooling
(especially without a degree) experience severe entry constraints in these full-time non-
farming occupations.
The variable used as a proxy for wealth in the regression, the value of livestock is significant
for male wage earners and non-farmers and for female wage-earners.  This means that the
relative probability of being in these jobs decreases when the value of livestock increases.
In the case of wage-work, one can say that well-off people will not hire out their labour,
they get higher returns in other activities.  People with a lot of livestock, m stly als  have a
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This is different from our data on children (see enrolment estimation in Verwimp, Ph., C.E.S., mimeo)
where we do have a lot of fathers who went to school and which reported this.  About 400 children
have educated fathers.  Since in our present estimation, where we are dealing with adults, we need
data on the educational level of their parents, where it is very likely that they did not go to school.
However, if father’s education is significantly determining enrolment and if one needs a degree to
enter a full-time economic activity outside farming, father’s education indirectly determines entry as
well.
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farm, which in turn reduces the relative probability of engagement in full-time off-farm
work.
The variable measuring the opportunity cost of labour, cultivated land per capita, performs
very well in the regression.  From the theory, we expect a negative effect of this variable on
the relative probabilities :  the larger the area cultivated relative to household members, the
lower the relative probability of doing off-farm work.  If labour is scarce on the farm, it has
a high shadow price, which keeps the household members on the farm.  In the regression,
this proves to be true for both men and women in case of part-time wage work and full-time
off-farm work.  The relative probability of entering income generating activities however,
increases when cultivated land per capita increases.  One way to interpret this is that these
people are relatively well-off, which means that they can hire in labour or rent out land and
choose for themselves an activity with a higher return than the return they would get in
farming.
In almost all cases, the presence of an all-weather road has a positive effect on the relative
probability of off-farm work.  Only once, in the case of males in income earning activities,
does the presence of an all-weather road decreases the relative probability.  In general
however, accessible roads will enlarge one’s opportunities to work outside the farm.  In the
case of wage labour for example, one can see the ease in which employees can be mobilised.
Roads decrease transport costs both for goods and for persons.  The effect of the distance
to town is puzzling, since the sign of the coefficient differs according to sex and activity.
Only in the case of females, the proximity of a town has a positive effect on the relative
probability of doing full-time off-farm work.  In all other cases proximity of a town has a
negative impact.
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6.2.2. Returns not corrected for selectivity
Regression 2b:Mincerian wage regressions with monthly wage as dependent variable and
years of schooling and years of experience as r gr ssors for the three
groups of people active in the paid labour force and for both sexes.  Not
corrected for selectivity.
Part-time farmers
part time wage
labour
Part-time farmers part-time
income generating activities
Full-time
non-farmers
man* man women man*
Variables in the equation
Constant 6.092 3.764 4.35 3.49
(7.776) (5.76) (11.46) (1.89)
number of years in school 0.053 0.045 0.016 0.15
(1.701) (2.669) (0.33) (3.74)
Age -0.114 0.041 0.008 0.0017
(-2.571) (1.19) (0.035) (0.144)
age squared -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.00018
(2.847) (-1.199) (0.32) (-0.102)
Adj.  R Square 0.085 0.034 0.02 0.254
F-stat 3.617 2.75 4.972
* not enough observations for regression for women.
For the men, schooling is significant in explaining wages of non-farmers and farmers who
engage in income-generating activities and almost significant for part-time wage earners.
With an extra year of education, the earnings of a non-farmer rises by 15 percent.  For
income generating activities, this is 4.5 percent and for wage earners 5%.
Referring  to the outline of Mincer’s original model on page four, we notice different values
of r depending on the category one belongs to.  It is thus not correct to interpret this r as a
discount rate that applies to all people in rural Ethiopia in the same way.  It is better to
understand this r as the internal rate of return for investment in education depending on the
kind of labour that one is involved in
15
.  The results in Regression 2b, which are not yet
corrected for selectivity, indicate that an extra year of education is more rewarding if you
have a full-time non-farming job than when you are part-time farming, part-time
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See our discussion on the discount rate, page four.
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non-farming.  If these results are maintained in the regression which does correct for
selectivity, this would be a clear indication of the segmentation of labour markets in rural
Ethiopia.  A typical example would be the profession of teachers in Ethiopia.  Teachers are
paid according to standards set by the government.  If you go 1 year to Teachers College
after high school, you earn less than a person who went two or three years to Teachers
College or who obtained an M.A.
The age variables (used as proxies for experience) are significant in explaining the wages of
men working part-time as wage labourers.  The same variable is insignificant in explaining
the earnings of a non-farmer and  a person in an income generating activity.  The sign of the
age variable in the regression for wage-labour however, is negative.  This unexpected result
might be explained as follows: in this kind of activities, productivity is not explained by
experience (human capital accumulation on the job) but by physical strength (or physical
ability).  Since physical strength decreases with age, the coefficient on the age variable is
negative
16
.
6.3. Returns corrected for selectivity
Regression 3:Mincerian wage regressions with monthly wage as dependent variable and
years of schooling years of experience and father’s education as regress rs
for the three groups of people active in the paid labour force and for both
sexes.  Corrected for selectivity.
Part-time farmers part
time wage labour
Part-time farmers part-time
income generating activities
Full-time
non-farmers
Variables in the
equation
man* man women man
Lambda 0.729
(2.589)
0.839
(2.643)
-0.099
(-0.306)
0.515
(1.736)
number of years in
school
0.051
(1.30)
0.059
(3.25)
0.102
(2.124)
0.178
(4.024)
age 0.153
(5.264)
0.168
(6.579)
0.232
(9.022)
0.178
(4.21)
age squared -0.0016
(-4.03)
-0.0019
(-6.031)
-0.0026
(-7.114)
-0.0022
(-2.65)
Adj. R Square 0.47 0.12 0.47 0.24
· not enough observations for regression for women
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A possible way to test this hypothesis is to add a proxy for physical strength in the regression, for
example the Quetelet Index (Body Mass Index (BMI)).  
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Lambda, the inverse Mill’s ratio is positive and significant for the men in all three groups.
The null hypothesis of m being zero has to be rejected, which means that we have a sample
selectivity bias.  Since Limdep software actually estimates -l th re is a positive correlation
between the unobserved variables in the wage equation and in the selection equation.
People entering paid economic activities in rural Ethiopia are non-randomly selected in
these activities.  The direct returns are 5% per year in part-time wage work, 6% per year in
part-time income generating activities and 18% per year in full-time non-farming economic
activities. 
17
The age and age squared variables are very significant and with the expected sign.  This is
an improvement in comparison with Regression 2b (not corrected for selectivity) where the
age variables are estimated insignificantly and with a non-expected sign.  One can say that in
the regression corrected for selectivity, the age variables are correctly estimated and the
direct effect of the coefficient of age and age square on earnings immediately is the full
effect since these variables do not turn up in the selection equation.  With human capital
theory, we can interpret these effects as the return to experience.  Experience increases
one’s skill and productivity which is rewarded with higher earnings.  At higher ages, when
one grows older and becomes less productive, the effect of age on earnings decreases
(coefficient of age square is negative).
18
  Depending on the group you are into, a extra year
of experience increases your monthly earnings by 15, 17 or 18 percent.
For the women in income earning activities, there is no selectivity bias since lambda is not
significant.  The direct return on education for these women is 10% per year.  The age
variables for women are also significant and have the expected sign.
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This b corresponds to the b in formula (a.2) in the appendix. I refer to the appendix for the discussion
on the marginal effects.
18
The estimation, however, is not corrected for hete oscedasticity, which means that standard errors are
biased.
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7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I tried to look at education in rural Ethiopia in an economists’ way.  I wanted
to know if education is a worthwhile investment.  Does education has an economic return in
rural Ethiopia?  If returns are substantial, parents have incentives to send children to school.
For reasons outlined above, I limited the study to those persons working in off-farming
economic activities.
From survey data and rural appraisals, we know that parents want to send their children to
school, parents have positive attitudes towards schooling.  Only a small minority of parents
is afraid that schooling will change the identity of a child.  I did not study the curriculum of
schools in rural Ethiopia.  It is indeed quite likely that a number of factors situated at the
level of the school influence enrolment.  One could think of tuition, availability of books,
quality of teaching staff, sizes of classes,...However, parents will judge all these factors and
weigh then with the return they expect from education.  I did not use expected return as a
variable in my enrolment regression, since we have no data on the monetary expectations
concerning child schooling in rural Ethiopia.  I did calculate realised returns from off-farm
activities.  In order to do so, I estimated a multinomial log t model using several variables
which determine the probability of entering a part-time or full-time non-farming economic
activity.  I applied the Lee-Heckman correction for sample selectivity in off-farm activities
and found that the individuals working off-farm are a non-random sample of the adult
population in our data-set.  The probability of an individual entering a non-farming
occupation as full-time economic activity increases when this person completed primary
school and increases strongly when this person completed higher secondary education.  The
returns on education in these activities are 18% per year, but this percentage is an
overestimation, one still has to subtract the partial derivative of lambda derived to
schooling.  It is sure however that education determines entry in these jobs and that the
return on education is substantial.  The return in part-time off-farm work is about 5%.
From these results, one can conclude that their are strong economic incentives to invest in
education.  This means that the reasons for underinvestment in education (low rates of
enrolment) are to be found at the household level, namely lack of resources to send children
to school and at the market level, namely imperfectly working credit and labour markets.
Households have difficulties to hire in labour to replace children on the farm and have
difficult or no access to credit to pay for child education (direct and opportunity costs).
The segmentation of the labour market is also demonstrated by the different internal rates of
return on education depending on the type of labour that one is doing.
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APPENDIX
There is a lot of discussion between scholars on the marginal effect of schooling.  There are
three ways to calculate marginal effects.  The first way is the unconditional return on
investment in education
( )J
J
b
E y
x
i
i
*
= (a.1)
it gives you the marginal return on 1 year of education without correcting for sample
selectivity.
The second way corrects for this.  The marginal effect on y in the observed sample consists
of two components.  There is the direct effect on the mean of y, which is b.  In addition, if
education variables appear in the selection equation, they will influence y through their
presence in l.  The full effect of changes in schooling on y is
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J
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0
(a.2)
because zi = f(xi,ti)
This gives the effect of schooling on earnings corrected for the fact that only members of a
particular group are observed
19
.
Since I use dummy variables for education in the selection equation, I should multiply the
formula in (a.2) by approximately 1/6 for primary education, ½ for junior secondary
education and ¼ for higher secondary education.
The third way to calculate the marginal effect of schooling takes account of the probability
to be a member of one of the three groups.  b gives you the marginal effect of schooling on
earnings for a person belonging to (= working in) one of three groups, but this effect must
be multiplied with the probability of belonging to this group.  Moreover, this probability
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However, I can not do the necessary derivations because I used dummies for education in my selection
equation.
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changes itself with an extra year of education.  The result is then the marginal return on
investment in education, conditional upon entry in one of the three groups.
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]J J
J
J
E y
x x
probg a E y g ai
i i
i= = =. for a is 1 to 4 (a.3)
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.
This formula gives the actual incentive to invest (or not) in education, since an individual
does not know in which occupation he/she will work.
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